

## MANAGEMENT OF THE DERADICALIZATION PROGRAM FOR TERRORISM CONVICTS IN CLASS I CORRECTIONAL FACILITY SURABAYA



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### ABSTRACT

*The Correctional Institution (Lapas), as a facility for implementing punishment that deprives most of the inmates' rights, should properly consider rehabilitation programs for inmates, including deradicalization programs for terrorism convicts. Therefore, research was conducted on the management of deradicalization programs for terrorism convicts in Lapas to address issues related to deradicalization rehabilitation for these inmates. This research uses a qualitative method with a case study approach at Class I Correctional Institution in Surabaya. The results of the study show that the management of the deradicalization program for terrorism convicts in Lapas generally follows several stages: decision management, program governance, stakeholder engagement, change management, and benefits management. Furthermore, reducing radicalism among terrorism convicts is influenced by several key factors in the deradicalization program's implementation, including social relations, coping, identity, ideology, and action orientation. In the implementation of the deradicalization program, several obstacles were also encountered, including inmates who remain highly radicalized and thus reluctant to cooperate with the Lapas programs, a lack of human resources capable of conducting deradicalization rehabilitation, and sectoral egoism among various parties, which hinders the effective execution of the deradicalization program. Suggestions for improvement include adjusting the placement of high-risk terrorism convicts to Lapas that align with the revitalization of the penitentiary system, providing deradicalization programs and human resource training for the officers if terrorism convicts are present, and enhancing coordination among the program organizers to ensure that the deradicalization process runs as intended.*

**Keywords :** Correctional Institution; Terrorism Prisoners; Deradicalization; Program Management



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## INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, as a country that upholds the rule of law and is not solely based on power, requires binding laws to create a well-ordered society. To achieve effective legal enforcement, development in the field of law should prioritize three main elements: legislation, law enforcement officers, and community layers. Correctional facilities are an integral part of the Criminal Justice System (SPP) in Indonesia, in line with Law No. 22 of 2022 concerning Corrections, which mandates that the correctional process covers the pre-adjudication to post-adjudication phases. As the final stage in the SPP, correctional facilities aim to fulfill the overarching goals and aspirations of this system, with inmate rehabilitation being a key component of its objectives.

The rehabilitation of inmates in correctional facilities requires serious attention, taking into account the diverse conditions of each offender, their families, and their social environments. A current challenge in addressing terrorism convicts lies in the lack of integration in their treatment, often resulting in their management ceasing upon capture or sentencing. Rachmayanthi et al. (2020) emphasize the critical importance of an integrated strategy for managing terrorism inmates within Indonesia's correctional facilities. Unlike other inmates, those convicted of terrorism offenses arise from radical and extremist ideologies, requiring specialized approaches to their rehabilitation (Horgan et al., 2020). Furthermore, Yuliyanto, et al (2021) argue that individual treatment approaches, tailored to the psychological and ideological backgrounds of each inmate, are essential for effective deradicalization efforts in Indonesia's correctional system.

In providing guidance for the rehabilitation of high-risk inmates, the Directorate General of Corrections (Ditjen Pemasyarakatan) has outlined a plan in the Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-24.OT.02.02 of 2018, which provides technical guidelines for the rehabilitation of high-risk inmates in correctional facilities. This decree is a derivative of the Minister of Law and Human Rights Decree No. M.HH-02.PK.01.02.02 of 2017, concerning operational guidelines for special correctional facilities for high-risk terrorist inmates. This regulation specifies the criteria and necessary actions for placing and rehabilitating high-risk inmates, as well as various forms of support.

According to Article 11, Paragraph 2 of Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-24.OT.02.02 of 2018, the guidelines emphasize that inmates should have a solid understanding of their religion, foster a sense of nationalism and patriotism, be legally informed members of society, and participate in a mental rehabilitation schedule (psychological counseling). This approach aims to facilitate behavioral change among terrorism convicts and help them reintegrate into society.


According to the Correctional Database System (SDP) of the Directorate General of Corrections, there were 272,276 inmates and detainees in Indonesia as of 2023. These individuals were distributed across correctional units throughout Indonesia, comprising 220,052 inmates and 52,224 detainees, with 318 identified as terrorism convicts, based on data reported by the SDP of the Directorate General of Corrections.

**Table 1**  
**Number of Inmates in Indonesia from 2019-2023**

NO	Inmate/Detainee Type	Years				
		2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1	Corruption	2.656 people	2.704 people	4.431 people	1.310 people	1.554 people
2	Narcotics	115.000 people	125.318 people	145.413 people	135.758 people	128.153 people
3	Terrorism	275 people	428 people	122 people	475 people	318 people
4	General	122.560 people	123.682 people	117.563 people	143.091 people	141.038 people

Source: Directorate General of Corrections – (SDP Public, 2023)

Table 1 draws particular attention to terrorism cases, especially for the Indonesian government, as Indonesia is considered to face significant terrorism threats. The data show a notable decrease in the number of terrorism convicts from 475 in 2022 to 318 in 2023, as indicated by trends in previous years. This decrease can be seen across various correctional units in Indonesia, which house dispersed inmates. The following chart presents statistics for terrorism convicts over the past four months:



Source: Directorate General of Corrections – (SDP Public, 2023)

**Figure 1**  
**Number of Terrorism Convicts in Indonesia**

From Figure 1, it can be concluded that the number of terrorism convicts in Indonesia has shown an upward trend over the past four months. Specifically, there was an increase from 174 in September to 180 in October, followed by a significant rise to 376 in November, before ending at 318 in December. These terrorism convicts are distributed across various correctional units in Indonesia.

The following table presents data on terrorism convicts currently serving sentences in Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya:

**Table 2**  
**Terrorism Convicts in Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya**

No	Name	Length of Sentence
1	AJ Bin IK	Lifetime
2	IFY Bin UY	Lifetime
3	ASJ Bin BS	5
4	S Bin B	5
5	MIG Bin SG	3
6	AS Bin HS	15
7	F Bin AM	3
8	MF Bin TR	6
9	G Bin MWS	3
10	HH Bin T	4
11	ES Bin KK	4

Source: Correctional Database System, Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya, 2024

Based on the Table 2, it is evident that Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya plays a strategic role in addressing deradicalization efforts for convicted terrorists through various programs developed in collaboration with the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT). As part of its operations focusing on inmate rehabilitation, the Directorate General of Corrections (Ditjen Pemasyarakatan) of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights issued technical guidelines to address terrorism crimes. These include Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-172.PK.01.06.01 of 2015 on the Standard Rehabilitation of Terrorism Convicts and Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-24.OT.02.02 of 2018 on Technical Guidelines for Rehabilitation of High-Risk Inmates in Special Correctional Facilities.

These regulations outline essential steps and requirements for placing and rehabilitating high-risk convicts, including facilities and competent human resources. According to Article 11, Paragraph (2) of Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-24.OT.02.02 of 2018, rehabilitation in Super Maximum Security Correctional Facilities includes religious awareness training, national and civic awareness training, legal awareness training, and psychological counseling. This program is part of the deradicalization efforts aimed at changing inmates' behavior, ultimately allowing them to move to lower-security levels, such as Maximum Security Facilities.

In line with the guidelines in the above regulations, it is imperative that high-risk terrorist inmates are placed in facilities with strict oversight, such as Super Maximum Security or Maximum Security Correctional Facilities. However, in practice, many terrorist convicts are still detained in medium-security facilities with standard security levels. In such facilities, the implementation of deradicalization programs may not align with the prescribed regulations, potentially hindering the deradicalization process for terrorist inmates.

To ensure that terrorist inmates have fully undergone a successful deradicalization program and genuinely pledged loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) requires specific attention, as it is not as straightforward as rehabilitating inmates with other types of cases. This process necessitates various elements, including competent human resources, clear regulations accompanied by the involvement of related agencies, and an optimized correctional system as part of penal revitalization efforts. However, these elements often fall short in medium-security correctional facilities outside Nusakambangan Island.

There is also a risk that a terrorist inmate's professed loyalty to NKRI may be temporary if they do not receive continued support through deradicalization programs

in the correctional facility. Terrorist inmates in Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya, for example, should be prioritized for deradicalization programs. As reflected in Table 1.2, the facility houses a relatively large number of terrorist convicts with extended sentences, indicating that the impact of the deradicalization program on their future rehabilitation is significant. Whether due to suboptimal program implementation or the inmates' reluctance to participate, the deradicalization process for these inmates must be prioritized to ensure they all receive the mandated program, as stipulated in the various regulations established for handling terrorist inmates.

## **LITERATURE REVIEW**

The study by Yuliyanto et al. (2021) focuses on high-risk correctional facilities, allowing for effective application of individual treatment as a deradicalization effort. In contrast, research conducted in Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya, a medium-security facility, faces limitations in program availability, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. Both studies implement similar rehabilitation types, as outlined in the Director General of Corrections Decree No. PAS-24.OT.02.02 of 2018, which includes religious awareness training, national and civic awareness, legal awareness, and psychological counseling as mandated approaches to deradicalization.

The study by Rachmayanti et al. (2020) highlights collaborative efforts between relevant stakeholders, including BNPT, in deradicalization efforts. Both this study and the one conducted at Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya work alongside BNPT to facilitate deradicalization initiatives. In Rachmayanti's study, data collected by BNPT is merged with correctional facility data to categorize risk levels into high, medium, and minimum. However, in Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya, BNPT plays a more dominant role in determining whether a terrorist inmate is eligible to pledge allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia. This reliance is due to the facility's limited access to detailed profiles beyond general inmate classifications, such as ISPN and RRI/Criminogenic, which are similar to those of general inmates.

The study by Barrelle (2014) aligns with the research conducted at Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya by utilizing the Pro-Integration Model, which involves the surrounding environment. While Barrelle's research primarily focuses on the general public, the study at Class I Correctional Facility Surabaya tends to concentrate on the interactions between correctional officers and general inmates as the immediate environment for terrorist inmates.

Program management relates to the harmonious management of a number of projects and other actions that will generate competitive advantages (Thiry, 2016). Program management emerged as a distinct discipline at the end of the 20th century. It is now generally agreed that a program is a significant effort consisting of various actions that cover multiple areas and are generally complex.

The deradicalization theory developed by Barrelle (2015) suggests that the process of disengagement or deradicalization, which is non-linear, occurs through three identity changes, including: a decrease in the intensity of commitment to extremist groups; the formation of a new self-identity; and the search for new individuals or entities for identification.

The implementation of the deradicalization program for terrorism convicts at Class I Surabaya Prison follows the program set by the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). This program aims for inmates to be cooperative after participating in it and to declare their loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) within the prison. If any inmates are found unwilling to make the NKRI declaration, they will

continue to receive intensive monitoring and further deradicalization training. Moreover, if these non-cooperative inmates persist in refusing to declare their loyalty, they may face the threat of being transferred to another prison, including those on Nusakambangan Island.

Inmates who have declared their loyalty to the NKRI are considered eligible to interact with others and participate in various rehabilitation programs available in the prison. Following their participation in these rehabilitation programs, evaluations are conducted to assess whether the inmates have reached a "green" status. If it is found that any inmates have been re-exposed to radical ideologies, they will receive special attention from prison staff. Should their behavior pose a danger, they may be transferred to a facility with higher security measures.

## **METHOD**

In this study, the author employed a qualitative approach as the primary method. The qualitative research method is an approach that examines natural phenomena with the researcher as the primary instrument, using data collection techniques that involve inductive analysis, and the research results are not aimed at generalization but rather at in-depth understanding. In qualitative research, data collection is not based on existing theories, but rather on the facts discovered during field research. Therefore, the data analysis conducted is inductive (Abdussamad, 2021).

Beyond these general characteristics, there are more specific approaches, namely investigative strategies, designs, or procedures in conducting qualitative research (Creswell & Creswell, 2021). The research design encompasses the entire process necessary for planning and executing the research (Nazir in Abdussamad, 2021). Case study is the research design plan used in the implementation of the research. According to Stake in Abdussamad (2021), reviewing case studies with an emphasis on a naturalistic qualitative approach is rooted in phenomenological and cultural interests. Case studies are chosen based on specific characteristics of the issues to be investigated. This constitutes a form of research or study focused on specific problems, targeting individuals, groups, or society in general.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

The the result of the NVivo 14 frequency word tool, which interprets its function as managing words with high frequency based on interview results. In other words, the analysis explains the identification of words that frequently appear in the research documents. These high-frequency words can serve as symbols, descriptions, or topics of intense discussion when gathering information from informants. The data collection by the researcher through interviews was conducted in Indonesian and Javanese as the local dialect.





Source: Processed by the researcher, 2024

**Figure 2**  
**Interview Results Based on Frequency Word**

The word analysis revealed high-frequency terms such as "narapidana" (prisoner), "terorisme" (terrorism), "program," "pembinaan" (rehabilitation), "BNPT" (National Counterterrorism Agency), and several supporting words like "peneliti" (researcher), "lapas" (prison), and "kegiatan" (activities) that frequently emerged in the analysis using this frequency word tool, which is relevant to the research title "Program Management of Deradicalization for Terrorist Prisoners at Class I Surabaya Prison."

- **Terrorism:** The existence of this word indicates that this research is closely related to the criminal acts experienced by the informants, namely acts of terrorism. This word refers to the main focus of the research issue regarding the program received by the prisoners.
- **Prison:** The frequent appearance of this word in the analysis indicates the location being researched by the researcher. In this case, it refers to the researcher's focus on Class I Surabaya Prison.
- **Program:** The frequent emergence of this word elaborates on the close relationship concerning the issues of the deradicalization program being researched, highlighting the needs of terrorist prisoners during their time at Class I Surabaya Prison.
- **BNPT:** The frequent occurrence of this word indicates the collaboration between the prison and related stakeholders as coordinators for the implementation of the deradicalization program across all prisons in Indonesia, including those at Class I Surabaya Prison.

## Management of Deradicalization Programs for Terrorist Prisoners at Class I Surabaya Prison

In the findings on the management of deradicalization programs, the researcher employed the program management theory popularized by Thiry and the deradicalization theory developed by Kate Barrelle. This theory is relevant to the issues

discussed as it directly relates to how prisons can implement deradicalization programs for terrorist prisoners through program management from various related institutions. The rehabilitation programs available at the prison are divided into two main categories: independence training and character development. These rehabilitation programs are regulated under Law No. 22 of 2022 on Corrections. Essentially, Class I Surabaya Prison is a general prison with medium security levels. Therefore, there are no specific measures for the security of terrorist prisoners.

The program management conducted by Class I Surabaya Prison in its rehabilitation program collaborates with various institutions in accordance with Government Regulation No. 77 of 2019 on the Prevention of Terrorism Crimes and Protection for Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers. Article 29, paragraph (1) explains that deradicalization for suspects, defendants, convicted persons, and prisoners of terrorism crimes is conducted by the relevant ministries/institutions jointly. In line with this article, Class I Surabaya Prison organizes deradicalization programs in collaboration with various agencies/institutions. Essentially, Class I Surabaya Prison does not have a specific program for terrorist prisoners; the existence of a special program for terrorist inmates at Class I Surabaya Prison is the result of collaboration with relevant stakeholders that support the deradicalization program.

Most of the terrorist prisoners at Class I Surabaya Prison are transfers from the Brimob Headquarters in Cikeas, who were subsequently moved to Class I Surabaya Prison. Upon entering Class I Surabaya Prison, the officers conduct an initial assessment to determine the needs, risks, and rehabilitation models for the inmates. The rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners at Class I Surabaya Prison is organized by the prison officers in conjunction with related institutions. After completing the reintegration stage and being returned to society, terrorist inmates continue to be monitored by the BNPT and agencies for former terrorist inmates.

The management of the deradicalization program at Class I Surabaya Prison is divided into several stages in accordance with the dimensions outlined in Thiry's Program Management Theory. Decision management refers to the decision-making stage regarding various alternatives that may be applied and modified according to existing programs. At Class I Surabaya Prison, the decision management phase for the deradicalization program involves making decisions to collaborate with various parties to provide deradicalization programs for terrorist prisoners.

Program governance involves the management of a program or system in operation. This system can hinder innovation and culture, as it focuses on two main perspectives: budget holders and stakeholders. Class I Surabaya Prison is a general prison with medium security but houses a considerable number of inmates. This situation should ideally encourage innovation; however, it is constrained by the available human resources and the regulations governing these programs.

Due to budget and human resource constraints, the technical implementing unit, in this case, Class I Surabaya Prison, can only participate in programs organized by the Directorate General of Corrections, which oversees various programs in technical implementing units. The internal parties at Class I Surabaya Prison can only adjust the existing programs for independence and personality development to fit the rehabilitation programs for terrorist inmates.

Stakeholder engagement involves support from organizations or third parties in identifying, analyzing, influencing, and engaging with relevant parties. Class I Surabaya Prison collaborates with various stakeholders who can support the implementation of



the deradicalization program for terrorist inmates. By establishing partnerships with diverse entities, the existing rehabilitation programs at Class I Surabaya Prison can be further developed. Such cooperation is also a key determinant of the success of the deradicalization program for terrorist prisoners. Addressing the needs of terrorist inmates requires a multi-faceted approach, as the involvement of various parties can help reduce radicalization among terrorist prisoners.

Change management involves managing changes that support a program previously deemed ineffective. This stage can encompass both planned and unplanned changes. The Head of Community Guidance (Kasi Bimkemas), as the party facilitating the deradicalization program, collaborates with various stakeholders to implement third-party deradicalization programs. The existing programs at the prison can be adjusted, supplemented, or even replaced as needed.

Benefits management is the process necessary to identify the needs and expectations of stakeholder involvement. The engagement of third parties in organizing deradicalization programs is advantageous for the prison itself, as the internal parties may not be able to provide the necessary deradicalization programs for terrorist inmates. It is hoped that collaboration with third parties will facilitate the provision of deradicalization programs and help reduce the radicalization rates among terrorist inmates.

The existence of third-party programs related to deradicalization for terrorist inmates not only benefits the prison but also aligns with the work programs or responsibilities of the BNPT itself. Additionally, there is cooperation with organizations of former terrorist inmates, such as the Alliance of Peaceful Indonesia and Prasasti Perdamaian, which consists of members who are former terrorist convicts. These organizations can motivate terrorist inmates at Class I Surabaya Prison to lower radicalization rates and remain cooperative in all activities.

In carrying out its duties, the BNPT (National Counterterrorism Agency) is fully responsible under Government Regulation No. 77 of 2019, Article 31, which states that deradicalization for suspects, defendants, convicts, and prisoners of terrorist crimes is provided through the following stages: Identification and assessment; Rehabilitation; Reeducation; and Social reintegration.

In the first stage, which is initial identification, the goal is to profile prisoners based on their cases, backgrounds, and motivations for engaging in radical actions. This is done to determine the needs of the inmates so that the rehabilitation can be targeted effectively. If initial and subsequent identifications reveal weaknesses in religious understanding, the BNPT will determine the necessary material. This may also involve collaboration with psychologists to assess any psychological issues that could pose obstacles, such as trauma experienced during arrest or legal proceedings, which may affect the effectiveness of rehabilitation. If psychological issues are identified, the BNPT will recommend psychological support as part of the rehabilitation process.

In the rehabilitation stage, the BNPT provides alternative narratives or materials to change or reduce radical understanding, such as national insight and differing religious perspectives. Once an inmate's level of radicalism is deemed to have decreased, they will proceed to the reeducation stage, which reinforces the changes that have taken place.

The final stage is social reintegration, which prepares inmates to return to society. The BNPT, in collaboration with Class I Surabaya Prison, organizes rehabilitation activities, including entrepreneurship training, and supports them in facing societal stigma. The BNPT also brings in psychologists to help inmates manage fears related to

their new status. Every program in the prison always coordinates with relevant parties, such as the Head of Community Guidance (Kasi Bimkemas) and other structural officials.

To reduce radicalization rates, continuous deradicalization efforts under supervision are necessary. The implementation of deradicalization at Class I Surabaya Prison aligns with the deradicalization theory proposed by Dr. Kate Barrelle. There are five dimensions in this theory that correspond with the implementation of deradicalization at Class I Surabaya Prison:

- 1) Social Relations: Social relationships are crucial in reducing radicalization rates, as they can curb the spread of hatred towards outside groups. In Class I Surabaya Prison, terrorist inmates who are considered “green” (low-risk) and deemed safe from potential disturbances can participate in rehabilitation programs like other inmates. This is essential to build their trust among fellow inmates without discrimination.
- 2) Coping: The mental health of terrorist inmates plays a vital role in decreasing radicalization. By fostering mental well-being, inmates can develop tolerance and concern for their surroundings. Many terrorist inmates have a limited understanding of radicalism, which can lead to individual egos causing division. By maintaining the emotional health of terrorist inmates, radicalization rates can also be reduced. In Class I Surabaya Prison, in collaboration with the BNPT, efforts to maintain the mental health of inmates start from the initial identification stage through to social reintegration. The prison, alongside various parties, strives to enhance tolerance among terrorist inmates, thereby reducing radicalization rates.
- 3) Identity : The recognition of identity for terrorist inmates can be seen through their involvement, as altering the characteristics of these identities plays a crucial role in the deradicalization process. By changing their identities, the BNPT (National Counterterrorism Agency) conducts initial and subsequent identification stages to profile each individual. With the support of officers at Class I Surabaya Prison, motivation is continually provided to help them disengage from various banned networks and organizations.
- 4) Ideology : As Indonesia adheres to the Pancasila ideology and upholds the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, it prohibits the emergence of new ideologies or forms of sovereignty, which can lead to various conflicts and acts of terror. Instilling a sense of unity among terrorist inmates who firmly uphold Indonesia’s sovereignty is challenging; various methods must be implemented to encourage them to recognize the nation's ideology. Subsequently, different approaches arise to reduce radicalization rates and foster a sense of brotherhood through the pledge of the NKRI (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia).
- 5) Action Orientation : Action orientation is a determining dimension for an individual's actions; all efforts regarding mental health, identity, social relationships, and ideology have been made to reduce radicalism among terrorist inmates. These efforts need to be accompanied by supportive actions that demonstrate that the inmate has genuinely reduced their level of radicalism. Class I Surabaya Prison provides various programs that support rehabilitation, with no differentiation between terrorist inmates and others, indicating that there is no discrimination against terrorist inmates, and they can participate in rehabilitation programs as intended.

## **Barriers to the Implementation of Deradicalization Programs for Terrorist Inmates at Class I Surabaya Prison**

For terrorist inmates who are still categorized as "red" (high-risk), there is a belief that any ideology differing from their own is unacceptable, making them resistant to the understanding being presented. They hold strong ideologies, making it difficult for them to accept others' viewpoints, which can lead to intolerance among different groups. These "red" inmates can also pose a threat to the safety of those around them and create potential disturbances in security if forced to participate in existing programs.

The second barrier is the assessment that the human resources at Class I Surabaya Prison are insufficiently qualified to implement deradicalization programs. Although there are approximately 162 officers capable of managing thousands of inmates, there are no officers specifically designated to handle terrorist inmates. Those who do oversee these cases are only performing additional tasks, not part of their primary responsibilities and functions.

The limitations in human resources within the prison inevitably place an excessive burden on the designated officers. This affects their willingness to perform their duties with sincerity, resulting in a lack of genuine commitment to the implementation of the existing deradicalization programs. Additionally, a lack of competence can hinder the running of these rehabilitation programs, as there is a concern that officers may become influenced by radical ideologies when interacting with high-risk terrorist inmates without adequate knowledge and training.

The third barrier is the sectoral ego of each institution, which hampers the execution of deradicalization programs within Class I Surabaya Prison. These deradicalization efforts must proceed in balance with the various perspectives of duties and functions within the prison, namely rehabilitation and security. If rehabilitation is conducted without sufficient security, it can lead to potential disturbances in security, thus obstructing the rehabilitation process.

At Class I Surabaya Prison, there are no officers specifically designated to handle terrorist inmates in terms of rehabilitation or security. If there are high-risk inmates, this presents a gap that could allow them to create potential security disturbances. On the other hand, the lack of intensive rehabilitation conducted by the BNPT also constitutes a barrier to the deradicalization efforts. Each inmate can participate in rehabilitation programs only four times, once for each stage. Thus, if there are no deradicalization activities or programs specifically for terrorist inmates conducted by the BNPT, the prison does not replace these with other activities. Similarly, other institutions collaborating with Class I Surabaya Prison do not engage intensively, which means that if there is insufficient deradicalization training, terrorist inmates receive no alternative rehabilitation, except for supervision from the direct officer or additional staff assigned to that role.

The limitations of the BNPT in carrying out its tasks also impede the implementation of deradicalization efforts. Not all terrorist inmates are concentrated in special prisons, whether in Nusakambangan or other locations outside Nusakambangan, including Class I Surabaya Prison. Given that Class I Surabaya is designated as a general prison and houses a significant number of terrorist inmates, it should receive more attention from the BNPT. However, the lack of BNPT presence in various regions, with only a central office in Bogor, results in deradicalization programs not being implemented intensively in every prison throughout Indonesia, including Class I Surabaya.

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

Based on the discussion, it can be concluded that the management of deradicalization programs for terrorist inmates implemented at Class I Surabaya Prison consists of several stages. The program management is generally in line with what exists in other technical implementing units within the correctional system. The stages align with the theories used by the researcher regarding program management.

Regarding the stages of the deradicalization program management at Class I Surabaya Prison, it is divided into five stages. The first stage, decision management, involves making decisions regarding several alternatives that can be utilized. The second stage, program governance, is the adjustment to the program governance or systems in accordance with existing regulations. The third stage, stakeholder engagement, involves organizational or third-party support in relation to the program. The fourth stage, change management, pertains to adapting changes that support existing programs with the backing of third parties to ensure effective implementation. The final stage, benefits management, is necessary to identify the needs and expectations of third-party involvement to optimize existing outcomes. All five stages are generally followed by the internal parties of the prison in managing the deradicalization program at Class I Surabaya Prison; however, in practice, adjustments are still required due to lengthy bureaucratic processes that can hinder the implementation of programs, necessitating improvisation of existing regulations.

Moreover, there are at least five factors influencing the deradicalization efforts related to reducing radicalization rates among terrorist inmates. The first factor, social relations, plays a vital role in decreasing radicalization through communication to curb the spread of hatred toward external groups. The second factor, coping, refers to efforts to address mental health issues in reducing radicalization. The third factor, identity, involves recognizing identities by altering identity characteristics during the deradicalization process. The fourth factor, ideology, aims to restore individual ideologies while fostering unity and tolerance within the national context. The fifth factor, action orientation, determines the existing deradicalization programs and is manifested in daily actions taken. It is essential to evaluate the level of radicalization among terrorist inmates through these factors to ascertain their radicalism levels.

In the implementation of deradicalization program management at Class I Surabaya Prison, there are at least three barriers. The first barrier is that high-risk inmates are unwilling to cooperate in the rehabilitation processes conducted. The second barrier is the inadequacy of human resources in their roles in reducing radicalization, both in terms of security and supervision. The third barrier is the sectoral ego of each institution, which hinders the progress of deradicalization programs.

To address these barriers in the management of deradicalization programs at Class I Surabaya Prison, the findings from the research lead to the following recommendations. First, there is a need for outreach regarding the distribution of terrorist inmates to the leadership. The distribution of inmates can be aligned with the existing technical implementing units in the correctional system based on security levels as per the revitalization of corrections stated in Regulation of the Minister of Law and Human Rights No. 35 of 2018, which classifies facilities as Super Maximum Security, Maximum Security, Medium Security, and Minimum Security. This classification should prevent high-risk terrorist inmates from being placed in prisons with medium security levels, where there is also a lack of rehabilitation programs tailored for them.

Second, if the distribution of terrorist inmates cannot be aligned with appropriate security levels or specialized rehabilitation handling, there should be

monitoring or training for officers managing terrorist inmates. Such training could include advanced security training to address potential disturbances caused by rebellious inmates and rehabilitation training to provide programs that can reduce the radicalization rates of terrorist inmates.

Third, there needs to be awareness of the importance of coordination among each responsible institution regarding the ongoing deradicalization programs. The programs issued by the BNPT are very limited and are rarely accepted by terrorist inmates; therefore, the internal parties of the prison must present alternative programs with other agencies for the rehabilitation of terrorist inmates. The responsibility for carrying out rehabilitation lies within the prison, which should enhance the performance of the correctional officers, especially for terrorist inmates, to be more attentive and disciplined in monitoring the supervision or rehabilitation received by these inmates.

In conclusion, this policy will help enhance the deradicalization rehabilitation that should be provided to terrorist inmates in prisons, reduce the potential for disturbances in security, and improve the existing deradicalization program management through various alternative programs that can be developed.

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